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A b s t r a c t . We recover and develop some robotic systems concepts (on 
the light of present systems tools) that were originated for an intended 
Mars Rover in the sixties of the last century at the Instrumentation 
Laboratory of MIT, where one of the authors was involved. 
The basic concepts came from the specifications for a type of gener-
alized robot inspired in the structure of the vertebrate nervous systems, 
where the decision system was based in the structure and function of the 
Reticular Formation (RF). 
The vertebrate RF is supposed to commit the whole organism to 
one among various modes of behavior, so taking the decisions about 
the present overall task. That is, it is a kind of control and command 
system. 
In this concepts updating, the basic idea is that the RF comprises a 
set of computing units such that each computing module receives infor-
mation only from a reduced part of the overall, little processed sensory 
inputs. Each computing unit is capable of both general diagnostics about 
overall input situations and of specialized diagnostics according to the 
values of a concrete subset of the input lines. 
Slave systems to this command and control computer, there are the 
sensors, the representations of external environment, structures for mod-
eling and planning and finally, the effectors acting in the external world. 
1 Introduction and a General Structure 
A research and development program being carried out at the Instrumentation 
Laboratory of MIT in the sixties, under the leadership of Louis Sutro [1–3], 
aimed at the communication of pictorial data from remote locations and to de-
velop methods of making fast and appropriate decisions there. Both general aims 
were to be obtained by the use of biology as a source of ideas. Warren McCul-
loch, then a member of the group [4, 5], had concluded from his life-long study 
of the human nervous system that the essential properties of human computa-
tion must serve as the basis of the corresponding artificial systems. Although he 
was aware of the dangers involved in embodying mental functions in physical 
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Fig. 1. Block diagram of generalized vertebrate nervous system 
devices, he developed a simplified model of the vertebrate brain. His intention 
was merely to suggest an organizational hierarchy necessary for robot perfor-
mance. Figure 1 is an outline of the model, where five principal computat ional 
areas and their connections are identified: the retina, the cerebrum, the reticular 
core, basal ganglia and cerebellum. 
A diagram of a possible engineering equivalent, proposed by Louis Sutro, is 
shown in figure 2, where the equivalent substi tutions beside the sensors are as fol-
lows: decision computer for reticular core; associative computer for cerebral cortex; 
timing, coordinating and autocorrelating computer for cerebellum; computer of ef-
fector sequences for basal ganglia and computer of specialized controls for lateral 
reticular nuclei. The memory is distributed and it should be associative. 
These general diagrams are still nowadays very much inspiring. For the sake of 
simplification, we shall reduce it to a diagram showing the specific counterparts 
in robotic and artificial intelligent tools t ha t each one of the large components 
may have. This is shown in figure 3. 
In this proposal, the overall system presents a set of "modes of behavior" t ha t 
mimic the accepted model of behavior of the vertebrates [6, 7], The selection of a 
particular mode is performed by the command and control system, based mostly 
in present sensorial information (S.D.) and the s ta tus of the system. An external 
input (EI) is allowed from the external world (in practice, it should came from 
operator 's console) to modulate the selection of a mode. 
Information concerning the selected mode (M) is sent to the sensors, which 
are to be tuned to optimize the d a t a acquisition pert inent to the mode of ac-
tion. It is also sent to the component labeled Files of World Representations, 
in which the appropriate model of the environment and of the system in the 
Fig. 2. Block diagram employing functional engineering nomenclature 
environment is selected to be sent to the component labeled Planning in Present 
World Representation. Finally, the selected mode commands and controls t he 
process of establishing goals according to the mode, the process of planning and 
the execution of the plan, by taking into account continuous highly processed 
sensory d a t a (S). Updated world representations are sent back through W.R. 
lines when the mode changes. There are also direct connections between sensors 
and actuators (line R) which are equivalent to reflex paths. Line E provides for 
high level instructions to the effectors according to the plan of action, which are 
to be decoded into concrete motor-effector actions. 
An appropriate computer architecture to embody such a system is shown 
in Figure 4. There are two types of specialized processors concerning the sen-
sory d a t a and concerning the effectors, which hung on the corresponding buses. 
Fig . 4. Computer architecture for an integrated system 
Command and control, as well as planning is performed by the Kernel, while 
computations corresponding to models of the environment are performed in the 
unit labeled C.M.E. (Computer Models of the Environment). 
2 Command and Control 
The basic function of a command and control system is to commit the whole 
system to one overall mode of behavior belonging to a not very large set. This is 
what enables it to behave as a well-integrated unit instead of a loose connection 
of separate sensors, effectors and processors. In this sense, a command and con-
trol computer is a close paradigm to the operation of the reticular formation in 
vertebrates [8]. Any mode of behavior is incompatible with any other. Some gen-
eral properties can be established for such a computer. First, it receives relatively 
unprocessed information from all of the sensors situated in sensory and effector 
sub-systems. Second, it gives signals, which control, tune and set the filters of 
all external inputs. In McCulloch words [4], “this is the structure that decides 
what to look and having looked, what to heed”. It also controls all the informa-
tion flow from and to higher level computers. This is similar to the problem of 
decision and attention [9, 10]. 
From a structural point of view, the command computer must have a modular 
architecture, or, at least, it must simulate it. The basic idea is that a set of 
computing units (C.U.) is such that each computing module receives information 
only from a reduced part of the overall, little processed sensory inputs (see 
figure 5). 
Each computing unit is capable of both general diagnostics about overall input 
situations and of specialized diagnostics according to the values of a concrete 
subset of the input lines. 
Fig . 5. Structure for a command and control computer 
A crucial point is that a consensus of the diagnostics, which corresponds to 
the selection of a single mode of behavior, must be reached by the computing 
units in a relatively short time. This requires a very strong crosstalk among 
the computing units, which is a peculiar feature of the so-called cooperative 
processors [4]. There are two basic properties of the computing modules that 
can be stated easily by means of the terminology common in expert system. 
In fact, we can look at the computing units as if they were simplified experts 
systems working on their own databases and with their own inference engines on 
their specialized domain of sensory inputs [11, 12]. But they are capable also of 
giving up before the evidence in diagnostics by other units, which show to have 
more relevant information for the case. This “giving up” must be understood 
in the sense of a recruiting of the rest of the modules by those having more 
confidence about their diagnostic. As it was stated by McCulloch [6], modules 
having the information pertinent to the case “cry louder”, and doing so, they 
recruit the rest. The result of this strong crosstalk is that the system converges 
into one mode, in the sense that practically all the units decide the same mode 
of behavior, though with perhaps different degree of confidence. 
Modularity and division of expertise, with overlapping among the computers 
units, are the two basic features of a cooperative processing system. Also, 
appropriate crosstalk rules are the necessary addendum to achieve convergence. 
This architecture is supposed to provide for two main goals: first, to speed up the 
decision process by which a mode of behavior is selected; second, the system is 
supposed to present high reliability, in such a way that it will arrive into an 
appropriate consented mode, even when some of the expert units are destroyed. 
This second aspect, that is, the reliability intrinsic to distributed expertise, 
precludes any decision based upon a single majority organ, because its malfunc-
tion will imply total inoperability. That is, the conclusion that a consensus has 
been reached cannot be the output of any special testing unit receiving its inputs 
from the expert units. Instead, the decided modes must be appropriately labeled 
according to their origin to prevent mixing, and be present in a non-computing 
structure, that is, a set of wires, or axons, or in other words, in a kind of decision 
bus. From this, it becomes clear that reaching a rapid consensus in the mode of 
behavior at the command and control computer is absolutely necessary for the 
Fig . 6. Illustration of two mechanisms for representing multi-sensorial data 
rest of the system to operate coherently, because, otherwise, the various higher 
and lower subsystems to be controlled, will have a high probability of picking up 
operation instructions from the decision bus, which belong to different exclusive 
modes of behavior, such that a kind of neurotic situation will be created. 
In sum, the role of the command and control computer is to sense crude 
sensorial data, and to decide modes of behavior sending them to the decision 
bus, through a strong crosstalk among units to converge into a single mode, so 
that coherent behavior is secured. 
3 Multi-sensorial Environment Representation 
There are two basic ways to structure multi-sensorial information which, in turn, 
admit different levels of representation, from geometric to highly symbolic. These 
two ways correlate with the finality of the representation which may tend to be 
optimal for discriminating among environment patterns or to be a representation 
to optimize the acquisition of clues for actions. These correspond to: 
a) Integrated representation, both at low levels of acquisition and a high level 
of the processing of sensory data. 
b) Step by step representation, in which integration only occurs at high level, 
that is in symbolic structures. 
In other words, and putting aside for the moment all natural systems, we 
may either represent the sensed environment by means of a multidimensional 
space where all sensory modalities are present with their own resolution at low 
level, while all high level processing is performed directly in this space [13]. Or 
we can construct a high level inter-sensorial representation space by previously 
extracting properties; classifying and labeling each sensory modality separately. 
These two options are illustrated in figure 6(a) and 6(b). 
These two possibilities seem to coexist in the highly parallel computing struc­
tures of natural systems. Thus, when trying to explain the strong discriminating 
power of the nervous system at high recognition and perception levels, it seems 
logically necessary to admit that a kind of integrated representation is present, 
because low level, almost primarily sensed clues, like a pitch or a color, are defi­
nite clues to identify high level situations. And also, there are very fast responses 
of natural systems to key overall internal-external situations that cannot be ex­
plained if elaborate computation in multi-sensorial representation spaces where 
required. In any case, it seems that the two coexisting mechanisms have a type of 
principle of constancy, in the sense that increasing one of them implies decreasing 
the other. A more detailed treatment of said mechanisms was presented in [14]. 
The above duality is, in fact, embodied in the general structure proposed in 
figure 1. Thus, the command and control computer will operate on data which 
follow the representation scheme of figure 6(b), while the Files of World Rep­
resentations, and, subsequently, the Planning Systems [15], operate according 
the scheme of figure 6(a). This implies that, when setting the mode of oper­
ation, different sensory modalities are taking separately the task of extracting 
medium level descriptors, which are necessary for the operation of the command 
and control computer. But, once the mode is decided upon, representation and 
planning structures shall take again the sensory data without much processing 
to “navigate” in a multi sensorial space where to perform processes, from low 
levels to high levels. 
This interpretation helps to understand how the nervous system is capable of 
sharing high level computing structures after depression or destruction of pri­
mary sensory channels [16]. That is, the so called inter-sensorial transformations 
can only occur in an integrated representation space as is shown in figure 6(b). 
Therefore, the command and control computer in natural systems has not the 
ability to use directly the expertise of computing units acting upon sensory data 
which are depressed, while in the planning and representation spaces, this is a 
possibility. In other words, there seem to be two different mechanisms for attain­
ing reliability and speeding up a decision and/or recognition process. That is, 
the command and control system operates with expert units which receive very 
restricted data, while the planning and higher structures have general purpose 
units which may work on almost row data form different sources. 
The above systems concepts are presently developed to obtain specific artificial 
intelligence symbolic models and neural nets representations. 
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